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Introduction
Secure property rights are important, even in traditional or customary systems
where formal title is not available or widely used. They encourage people to invest in
their resources and protect those investments against expropriation. Security of property
rights rest on their clear definition and defense (Acemoglu et al. 2004; De Soto 2000;
Fukuyama 2004; Libecap 2003; Norton 2000; Weimer 1997). Yet in many parts of the
world, property dispute resolution processes are unclear or inaccessible due to lack of
facilities, education or public sensitization. In much of Sub-Saharan Africa, the presence of
multiple and overlapping legal systems further complicates the process of dispute resolution.
Moreover, the legal systems that exist, customary and public, may not always recognize or
enforce the same set of property rights. Ambiguity in the definition or enforcement of
property rights leads to an increase in transaction costs in the exchange and transfer of land
as well as a residual uncertainty after any land contract. The issue of dispute resolution with
regard to property rights has been largely neglected in the academic literature, in part,
because many of those writing on property rights live in countries where adjudication is
neither a mystery nor a particular problem (although it may become so if one has the
misfortune of becoming involved in a legal dispute).
The disjuncture between public and customary law regulating property rights is a
problem for capital formation across Africa (Joireman 2008). In Kenya, government
efforts to establish formally defined property rights and adjudication mechanisms have
been plagued by the existence of competing customary processes for the resolution of
disputes. Seeking to advance the state of knowledge regarding the enforcement of
property rights in areas with legal pluralism, this paper will compare the nature and costs
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of the formal and customary methods of property rights adjudication. Customary dispute
resolution has been praised as an inexpensive alternative to official judicial settlements in
a legally pluralistic environment. However, our research demonstrates that customary
processes may also carry a monetary cost that puts them beyond the means of many
citizens. Rent-seeking, the use of public office to extract personal payments, at all levels
of both the formal and informal adjudication processes makes the settling of land disputes
prohibitively expensive.

Customary Law and Traditional Dispute Resolution
Colonization left a complex legal arena in Sub-Saharan Africa in which
customary and public law co-exist and sometimes conflict. Customary law is a body of
rules governing personal status, communal resources and local organization in many parts
of Africa. It has been used by various ethnic groups for their internal organization and
administration. Customary law is recognized by the courts and exists as a second body of
law (in addition to statutory law) governing citizens in countries of Sub-Saharan Africa.
It has the greatest control over people in rural areas, but also affects urban dwellers
through the regulation of marriage and inheritance.2 While in some areas it is clear that
customary law pre-existed colonial contact (Gluckman 1965, 1955; Nadel 1947) in other
areas customary law developed in tandem with colonization, at times facilitating the
process of domination (Ghai and McAuslan 1970). Some scholars would go so far as to
argue that customary law was invented by colonial powers, rather than simply being

2

See for example the much-discussed Otieno case in Kenya in which a wealthy, urban, Kikuyu woman
wanted to bury her husband, a Luo, on his farm outside of Nairobi as per his wishes. His family insisted
that he must be buried in Western Kenya, his home area. Since his natal family and not his wife was
viewed as the next of kin, their wishes won out. For more detail regarding the case see (Gordon 1995).
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codified or recognized by the colonial regime (Ranger 1983; Chanock 1991). Chanock
notes that "The enormous multiplication of miniscule African Monarchies, which created
the setting for customary courts, customary judges and customary law, was more a
feature of the colonial period than a continuation of pre-colonial life’ (Chanock 1998:
34).

Other scholars emphasize customary law as an alternative realm of struggle over

power and the allocation of resources (Nyambara 2001; Berry 1992).
Customary law provides a system of rules for the allocation and adjudication of
property rights. Typically, it is used as a tool through which traditional leaders (chiefs,
elders or headmen) can evaluate claims to property and resolve disputes regarding land.
The logic of customary law focuses on the well-being of the community, rather than the
rights of the individual. In practice this means that customary legal decisions tend to be
compromises rather than clear decisions for one party against another. Anyone making a
claim to land in a customary legal system will be making it in the context of the
relationships that construct the lineage and social system of their community.

The

vitality of that social system may take precedent over individual rights.
Literature regarding customary systems of resource management (land, water and
forests) values their flexibility and protected access for members of traditional
communities (Benjaminsen and Lund 2002; Ribot 1999; Toulmin et al. 2002). Similarly,
customary dispute resolution systems are praised for their accessibility, local knowledge,
low cost and speed when contrasted with national court systems and public law
(Connolly 2005; de Sousa Santos 2006; Kane et al. 2005; Nyambu-Musembi 2003; Penal
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Reform International 2000).3 Customary systems may also appear to be a better venue
for women’s legal disputes given women’s negative experiences with formal dispute
resolution systems (Manji 1999). However, the most positive assessments of women’s
property rights in customary tenure systems notes the necessity for women to negotiate
their social relationships in order to sustain access to land through changing life
circumstances (Griffiths 1998; Rose 2002). Difficulties in ensuring women’s access to
land have been noted as a problematic feature of customary institutions of dispute
resolution (Nyambara 2001; Kasanga 2002; Turner 2005; Lastarria-Cornhiel 1997).
In the following sections we will examine the cost and clarity of dispute
resolution regarding land in Kisii, Kenya. In so doing, we explicitly neglect a discussion
of what both the formal and the customary systems might be intended to do (e.g. provide
justice, preserve community interests) and an evaluation of the validity of these different
intents.

We instead choose to address the process of how people resolve property

disputes to assess the accessibility and effectiveness of customary law.
This research was conducted over a six month period in 2006 and 2007 using
structured interviews with women’s groups, community leaders, lawyers and civil
servants. Women are the focus of the study because 1) women in Kisii have less social
capital than men and are therefore more vulnerable to infringement upon or loss of their
property rights in conflicts regarding land and 2) women’s property in East Africa has
been identified in past literature as particularly vulnerable to expropriation (Joireman
2007; Strickland 2004).

3

Although often customary systems of law are grouped under the rubric of informal systems, a category
which captures a variety of dispute resolution mechanisms, some of which may be far less entrenched
culturally than customary law particularly as it is applied to property rights.
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After describing the Kisii region and the methodology of the field research this
paper will address the issue of insecurity of property rights in land for women in Kisii
with a focus on the types of land disputes that arise.

This will be followed by a

description of the costs that are incurred in the formal and the informal methods of
dispute resolution. A concluding section emphasizing the findings of the paper will
follow.

Kisii Region
Kisii region, named after the Kisii ethnic group (also known as Gusii), is located
in the fertile highlands of Nyanza province in Western Kenya. The Kisii region contains
three political districts: Kisii Central, Nyamira and Gucha. The administrative hierarchy
in each district is made up of a District Commissioner, several District Officers, chiefs
and elders (Okuro 2002).

The Kisii area is one of the most densely populated in Kenya

as it covers 2204 km2 and sustains 1.6 million people (Central Bureau of Statistics 2001)
almost all of whom are ethnically Kisii.
Most of Kisii’s population engages in subsistence farming of food crops (maize,
beans, bananas, sorghum and millet) supplemented by cash-crops such as tea and coffee
as acreage allows (Waithaka et al. 2000). Average household size is five people and
farms are between one and four acres (Central Bureau of Statistics 2001). A growing
population is putting enormous pressure on the land. The customary inheritance system
requires that each son receive an equal share of the land; consequently the land available
for each family is decreasing with each generation. The average monthly income per
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capita is 1496 KSHs ($21)4 (The Third Welfare Monitoring Survey 2002) and the average
monthly expenditure per household is 3250 KSHs ($46), 86% of which is spent on food
(The Third Welfare Monitoring Survey 2002).

Women and Land in Kisii
Women in Kisii, like most African women in customary tenure systems, have
only secondary or use rights to their husband’s land. They have a customarily recognized
right to farm the land, but cannot own it or control its dispossession. Occasionally, if
they are unmarried with a child, they will have use rights to their father’s land, but these
cases are exceptional. According to one women’s group, “You can feel free to use [the
land] in matters of cultivating it. But you cannot do any major thing. You cannot decide
to sell it” (CA 2006). Only one woman out of all participants in sixteen group interviews
claimed to possess the title deed for her land (Nyamira 2006b). This is representative of
what scholars have noted with regard to customary tenure across Sub-Saharan Africa that
"...men and women have rarely, if ever, had identical; kinds of claims to land, largely
because the genders have very differentiated positions within the kinship systems that are
the primary organizing order for land access" (Whitehead and Tsikata 2003: 77).

The

overwhelming majority of women are unable to rent out their land or use their land as
collateral for a loan in spite of the fact that, according to all interviews conducted, women
are the ones who work the land raising both subsistence and cash crops.
4

Per capita income was calculated based on information from three relevant districts (Kisii Central, Gucha,
and Nyamira) published the Kenya National Human Development Report (NHDR). Annual per capita
income is Kshs 22,740 for Kisii Central; Kshs 16,831 for Gucha; and Kshs 14,293 for Nyamira. GDP per
capita (US$ PPP) is $663, $490, and $416, respectively (p. 71). In order to arrive at an estimated monthly
per capita income for the region, we average the annual per capita income of the three districts and divide
by twelve. [(22,740 + 16,831 + 14,293)/3] / (12 months) = 1,496. The exchange rate used was 1 USD to 70
Kenyan Shillings, which leads to a per capita monthly income of $21.
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Not only do women lack control over the land they farm, they also generally do
not control the income from the crops they produce. Four of the Kisii women’s groups
stated that they negotiate with their husband about how to spend the money from cash
crops, while the remaining eleven expressed that a husband or father exercises exclusive
control over household resources.
Because women’s access to land is mediated by familial relationships, issues of
inheritance were raised frequently during the interviews. The following section will
focus on how women’s articulation of their perceived insecurity of property rights is
affected by widowhood, inheritance from parents and/or polygamy.

Women’s Property Rights Insecurity
The Kisii community includes a high number of widows, due in part to the impact
of HIV/AIDS. Widowhood results in challenges to women’s property rights from
relatives of a deceased spouse.

This usually involves moving the boundary of the

widow’s land by planting crops on its fringes or simply removing the widow from the
land and taking her fields. This practice is referred to locally as ‘chasing’ a woman from
her land and/or home. A widow’s vulnerability to these pressures is determined by an
interplay of several factors including the gender and age of her children, the payment of
bride price,5 her character, and her HIV status. Surprisingly, considering the ethnic

5

In Kenya, bride price is paid to a woman’s family in exchange for her labor which is going to her
husband’s family. Although the payment of bride price is increasingly being negotiated within families and
relationships it is still seen as a significant indicator of the legitimacy and even legality of a marriage under
customary law.
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homogeneity of Kisii, ethnic identity appeared to have no affect on a widow’s level of
vulnerability.6
Women interviewed described their value as wives as based on their ability to
bear children. The age and gender of children was reported to be one of the most salient
factors affecting a widow’s security of property. Should a woman be widowed before
bearing children she is likely to face stigmatization as well as pressure to abandon the
land she farms. One women’s group asserted that “according to Kisii tradition, [a woman
is] useless without children”(Itogio 2006).

A widow who has only given birth to

daughters faces less pressure, although she is still more vulnerable than a woman with
sons (CA 2006; Trinity 2006). Sons are seen as members of the lineage while daughters,
who will leave and marry into other lineages, do not have the same permanence of
membership. Statements from women in Kisii regarding the importance of children are
consistent with literature on women in customary land tenure systems (Wanyeki 2003).
A woman without sons has several traditional options to acquire heirs and
thereby legitimize her presence on the land. She may adopt children or “marry” a woman
with children by paying bride price for the wife of an imaginary son whose “children”
become her grandchildren (CA 2006; Global Health Reporting 2006; Nyamira 2006a).7
Women’s groups agreed that should a widow without sons lack the resources or the will
to pursue either of these traditional practices, she would be “chased” from the land forced to leave by her in-laws. Again, we note that these statements from women in Kisii

6

All women’s groups as well as chiefs and elders responded that this factor did not contribute to land
disputes. A Luhya widow living in the area described her conflict with land as pertaining only to her
questionable association with her deceased husband, and specifically not to her ethnic identity.
7
This practice was mentioned by all women’s groups.

10
are consistent with literature on the importance of children in maintaining access to land
in Kenyan customary systems.
Perceptions of a woman’s character determine her vulnerability to land
expropriation.

A woman can be accused of having ‘bad character’ for practicing

witchcraft, being sexually promiscuous, drinking too much or being rude or stubborn,
particularly toward her in-laws (Nyamira 2006b). A widow of bad character is very
likely to have difficulty holding on to her land. A Kisii District Officer confirmed this
trend, stating that “Someone might marry a lady who is not accepted by the family. So
once the husband dies they are very fast in chasing that lady [off the land]” (Monganya
2006). One study of women’s land rights in sub-Saharan Africa notes that local level
land-management fora “…make moral and material evaluations of inputs and behavior
between male and female household members over a very wide spectrum when
adjudicating land claims" (Whitehead and Tsikata 2003). Adding this factor to the
absence of sons or incomplete payment of bride price significantly increases the
insecurity of a widow’s property rights. Ritu Verma has noted that “Widows who are
newly married, have small children, have bad reputations within their families are
particularly vulnerable to being chased off their land” (Verma 2001: 99).
Women expressed their desire to inherit property from their parents and to retain
control over property they occupied. Traditionally, land was divided solely between the
sons and although public law now allows daughters to inherit ("The Law of Succession
Act" 1981), the practice of excluding women from the inheritance of land has remained
strong in Kisii. According to all women’s groups, a woman cannot inherit land from her
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father (Tabaka 2006).8 Increasingly irregular marriage patterns mean that many women
have children with a man, but remain formally unattached to his household (Hakannson
1994). Such women are in a very precarious position because they need land to grow
food for their children, yet cannot claim land from the lineage of their children’s father
due to the absence of formalized ties.9
The last category of women who are at high risk for land insecurity are widows
from polygamous marriages.

These women face the same challenges as those in

monogamous marriages concerning children, character, bride-price and HIV/AIDS, but in
polygamous marriages these factors are compounded by competitive pressure.
Traditionally, the first wife would be given more land than the second wife due to her
senior status. According to one women’s group “it’s obvious that the first wife gets a
bigger share” (Tabaka 2006). However, other women’s groups reported that the practice
has now changed: “Long ago is when they used to give the elder wife a bigger portion of
land, like they had the respect” (Geonseri 2006). Today it is generally expected that each
wife will be given an equal share of the land. Yet, a husband may still give more land to
the wife he favors due to the number or gender of children, the woman’s character, or
simply spousal affection. In polygamous marriages women reported analogous concerns
regarding property rights as women in monogamous marriages in that wives with sons
are favored over wives with daughters and barren women will have difficulty holding
onto their land (Naomi 2006; Obotaka Self-Help 2006).

8

The women in Tabaka Single Mother’s Group rented land as a result. The women in Nyosia Single
Mother’s Group on the other hand, were allowed to live with their parents as part of the household but
could expect to be forced to leave when the land is divided among the sons (Nyosia 2006).
9
There was some indication that this tradition may be changing. One group stated, “We don’t know in
future, because now we have seen differences. Maybe in future we don’t know” (Obotaka Self-Help 2006).
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The weakness of women’s property rights in Kenya has been noted in the past as
a problem rooted in both statute and customary law. "The position of women in relation
to matrimonial property is also extremely weak. Customary law in relation to property
rights of women seems to be out of step with the present economic structure and this has
the effect of weakening the economic power of women” (Ikdahl et al. 2005: 92).
All of the issues noted above make women’s property rights vulnerable. What
strategies can they follow to try and prevent the loss of their use rights or regain them
when taken? Women who lose their land or whose land is encroached upon by neighbors
appear to have a choice in terms of which type of adjudicatory structure they can use to
pursue their complaint, the formal court system (which incorporates some customary
elements) or the informal use of elders and chiefs, which has been the forum of choice for
dispute resolution of conflicts over ‘family’ or customary land. These channels and their
costs will be discussed in the following section.

Methodology
This study used interviews and focus groups to explore property disputes and
perceptions of formal and customary systems of dispute resolution. Care was taken to
conduct interviews in each of the three districts that comprise Kisii so as to make them as
comprehensive and descriptive of the area as possible.
The initial interviews were structured and conducted with various groups and
individuals.
people.10

We interviewed sixteen women’s groups, ranging in size from 15 to 20
The purpose of these interviews was to determine the kinds of land disputes

pursued by women in the Kisii area, the variables that make them vulnerable to disputes
10

Four of these were widow’s groups, two were HIV support groups, and two were single mother’s groups.
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and the path they would generally follow in seeking resolution.

Nine interviews were

conducted with chiefs and 10 with elders, to determine their perceived role in handling
land disputes.

In addition, we interviewed 30 women who had personally sought

resolution to a land dispute in order to understand how the general trends discussed in the
women’s groups played out in concrete examples. Lastly, we interviewed three District
Officers, two lawyers, and several NGO employees in order to gain an understanding of
both the formal and customary structures that exist for resolving land disputes.
The interviews revealed the existence of two perceived paths for dispute
resolution. Both initially rely on customary mechanisms – the intervention of elders and
chiefs - but then diverge into two channels: channel (A), an informal process based on
the previous legal regime of arbitration of land disputes through the provincial
administration, and channel (B) which has the elements of the official, formal procedure
along with the initial role of elders and chiefs. It is important to note that by law, elders
and chiefs are excluded from resolving property disputes unless they are serving on a
Land Tribunal. Yet, from these first interviews it was apparent that for property disputes
even the formal channels had a customary component, so there is no exclusively formal
channel of dispute resolution. In order to determine the women’s, elder’s and chief’s
knowledge and perception of these channels, we showed the following diagrams tracing
each channel. Interviewees were asked which channel was officially correct, which best
represented reality, and the amount of money (both fees and side-payments) required at
each step of each process.
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Figure 1

B
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Court
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Land Tribunal
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Chiefs
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A dotted line indicates an informal link and a solid line a formal process.

This exercise, with the addition of questions concerning the livelihood and level
of education of the interviewees, was conducted with five women’s groups ranging in
size from ten to thirty people. We selected groups from communities representing each
district. In an attempt to trace the steps and fees required in the formal channel, we also
consulted lawyers and the Land Registrar’s office in Nyamira District.

Dispute Resolution Regarding Land Conflicts
The structure of the Provincial Administration is a vestige of British colonial rule.
The British government retained the institutions of elders and chiefs, but appointed the
officeholders, made them responsible for dealing with local disputes and installed District
Officers and District Commissioners to oversee the work of the local leaders. This
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‘traditional’ structure was often imposed on ethnic groups that had not previously had
such a hierarchical system of governance (Chanock 1991b). After independence, Kenya
retained this form of Provincial Administration (Okuro 2002), appointing District
Officers and District Commissioners from any region, but requiring that chiefs come
from the area in which they work and that they carry out their duties through local elders
(The Chief’s Act 1988; SK 2006).
In Kisii, both processes of dispute resolution articulated by those living in the area
begin with the local elders and chiefs who make up the lowest levels of the Provincial
Administration. Traditionally, the elders of the household and the surrounding
households would gather at the disputed area to resolve the dispute while they ate a meal
prepared by the women of the household (Botara 2006; Elders group 2006). However,
although chiefs and elders were incorporated into the Provincial Administration structure
during the colonial era, their current legal role in dispute resolution is outside the law.
The Land Disputes Tribunals Act of 1990 recognizes the role of elders only when
empanelled on a Land Tribunal and in no other context.
In spite of the fact that elders and chiefs no longer have legal authority in a land
dispute unless they are sitting on the Land Tribunal, they continue to act as mediators
according to the customs of their ethnic group or clan. Instead of providing a meal for
the elders as was the custom, those involved in the dispute are now expected to give
money (SS 2006). Land decisions made at any level within the Provincial Administration
are non-enforceable and not binding. According to an advocate in Kisii,
“[the elders and the chiefs] are not being encumbered by technicalities of
law. Because you know the law we administer in court is very technical,
but with them they administer it with a sense of justice. … They are not
being governed by any rules and law. So sometimes they can administer
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justice or sometimes they can administer injustice. …The kind of justice
you can get from the Provincial Administration is amorphous and is not
binding.” (Otieno 2006).
Since independence the only source of legally binding land dispute arbitration has
been the court system. However, the Kenyan court system has been hamstrung by
corruption, inefficiency and expense. During the Moi era, courts were discouraged from
making land allocation decisions as this was a source of political patronage for the
president (Okuro 2002). A local lawyer stated that, “the justice system is expensive. …
You’ll find you require a lot of money. First to file your case, secondly to pay your
lawyer, and thirdly, the courts are overworked… A case can take as long as five years for
it to be heard and finished. Even ten years sometimes” (Otieno 2006). Furthermore, not
all communities have a court and there is a lack of awareness about their function in land
disputes. As a result of this inaccessibility of the courts, the Provincial Administration’s
arbitration system (the informal system) figured below was the most prominent one in
Kisii until recently.
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Figure 2
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The customary law that operates within both dispute resolution tracks has become
increasingly delegitimized due to perceived abuses (Obarie 2006). A District Officer
explained that
it reached a time when the government felt that land issues specifically
were getting too technical and there is some kind of misuse of office.
You know, even the elders … became too corrupt. … You go there, even
if you are a poor kind of mama, they want to sit together, and before they
sit, they want you to give them something small. So the complaints kept
on rising until the government decided to start another section of tribunal
– something like a local court” (SK 2006).

In response to these issues of perceived corruption, the Kenyan government set up Land
Tribunals through the Land Disputes Tribunal Act of 1990. This Act created a system for
selecting a group of elders from each district, from which the District Commissioner
would choose a panel to act as the Land Tribunal and hear cases regarding land,
adjudicating them “in accordance with recognized customary law” (Republic of Kenya
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1991: 3). The members of the tribunal are chosen from the local community so that they
are familiar with the local customs but, unlike the Provincial Administration, they have
been given jurisdiction over land disputes and are bound by statutory law (Kajuju 2006).
Although the Land Disputes Tribunal Act became law in 1990, implementation in Kisii
did not begin until 2004 (Kajuju 2006; SK 2006; SS 2006).
Officially, the elders and chiefs are supposed to refer those with cases to the Land
Tribunal.

One Kisii chief correctly identified the formal process “because of the

government policy, I have to advise the people to go and see what we call the Land
Tribunal Board” (Botara 2006). Similarly, a group of elders in Kisii Central explained
that they no longer hear many land dispute cases because people are referred to the Land
Tribunal (Elders Group 2006). According to an assistant chief from Nyamira, “they
changed, now they said the chiefs, they should recommend the tribunal. Then if the
tribunal fails … it has to go to court” (FO 2006). The current, official dispute resolution
channel, where elders and chiefs serve only the role of referral, is depicted below.
Figure 3

B
Court

Land Tribunal

Chiefs

Elders

Family
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Channels A and B roughly represent, respectively, the previous process of land
dispute settlement (what was law prior to 1990) and the current process of land dispute
settlement. However, in the interviews and focus groups it became apparent that most
women would only follow the first three steps (the customary process) to solve their land
disputes, going through family, elders and chiefs who have no official legal role.
Although most of the chiefs and many of the elders acknowledged that they no longer
had official sanction to provide arbitration in land dispute cases, most asserted that they
would still hear “small cases” if they believed they would be able to solve them (MO
2006a; PO 2006; SS 2006; ZN 2006). Only should they fail to reach an agreement
between the parties would chiefs and elders refer them to the Land Tribunal. Thus they
have retained their arbitration roles, in spite of the 1990 law designed to circumscribe that
function. According to a study of the Land Tribunals, “the involvement of the Provincial
Administration [Assistant Chiefs, Chiefs, District Officers and District Commissioners]
in land issues continues to work against the aims of the Tribunals” (Okuro 2002).

Perceptions of Accessibility of Dispute Resolution Channels
The diagram exercise was designed to ascertain the knowledge of the women as
to which dispute resolution mechanism should be used for conflicts over land. It revealed
great inconsistencies with regard to perceptions of the correct dispute resolution channel.
Of the five women’s groups, two selected channel A as the legally correct path, two
chose channel B and one picked a modified channel B (they removed the Land
Tribunal!). The former two groups included women who were employed in waged
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positions while the latter three were comprised exclusively of subsistence farmers. This
suggests that regardless of socio-economic status, women have limited awareness of the
mechanisms of dispute resolution available to them. Of the eight elders and chiefs who
participated in the exercise, six selected channel B as the correct path but combined it
with channel A. One Kisii chief explained,
Initially we used to have this (A). This was the first: family, elders,
chiefs, DOs and DCs: what has been happening for many years after
independence. But what is happening now, it is now this (B): family,
elders, chiefs, tribunal, court. But somehow, even before they come to
the tribunal, in between the chiefs it is the DOs. It is family, elders,
chiefs, DOs, DC, tribunal, court. (Botara 2006).

The remaining elder and assistant chief selected channel A as the correct path, suggesting
a delay in the dissemination of information within the Provincial Administration.
The alteration of the official dispute resolution channel in 1990, though intended
to change the arbitration role of the elders and Provincial Administration to one of
referral, has resulted in the addition of the Land Tribunal to the previous arbitration path.
The answers from women, chiefs and elders concerning the correct dispute resolution
path revealed ambiguity and inconsistency in the understanding of the official dispute
resolution channel, not only among the women who might use the dispute resolution
systems, but also among those who are responsible for advising them regarding
appropriate procedure.
All who participated in the exercises agreed, however, that going to the elders and
chiefs was the only option for women with land disputes due to the financial
requirements of all resolution forums beyond the chief. Each women’s group, as well as
each chief and elder, was asked to estimate the cost of the steps in their chosen correct
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resolution channel. The average amount for the Land Tribunal was 3700 KSHs (appr.
$53). The average monthly income per capita in Kisii is 1496 KSHs ($21) for 2006
(United Nations Development Programme 2006). In other words, over two month’s per
capita income would be spent on a land dispute. Officially, filing a claim at the Tribunal
costs 1000 KSHs ($14), and should the Tribunal members visit the land that is being
disputed, there is an additional cost of 500 KSHs ($7) (Kajuju 2006).

However,

according to the Land Registrar’s Office in Nyamira and local lawyers, the disputing
parties are also requested to pay for lunch and transport for the tribunal members since
their salary of 500 KSHs per case is insufficient (Kajuju 2006; Nyaundi 2006). The
women’s groups as well as chiefs and elders who chose some variation of resolution path
B claimed that taking a dispute to court would cost at least 10,000 KSHs ($142). This
was confirmed by a lawyer, who estimated that a court case would cost between 10,00030,000 KSHs ($142-$428), and would sometimes take years to settle (Nyaundi 2006).
Again, for a woman in a household with a per capita monthly income of $21 this is
prohibitively expensive.
Those women’s groups who chose dispute resolution path A estimated that taking
a case to the District Officer or District Commissioner would cost 70,000 KSHs
($1000)11. Rather than an accurate estimate, this appears to be an indication that none of
these women have approached the District Officer or District Commissioner with a case
and expect that doing so would cost a sum of money far too large for them. The elder

11

All average figures from the diagram exercise were reached by finding the average. The estimated costs
for the court and tribunal are the average of both the women’s and the elder’s and chief’s responses
whereas the estimated costs for elders and chiefs were averaged seperately, reaching one average figure
from the perspective of the elders and chiefs and one from the women’s groups.
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and assistant chief who chose dispute resolution channel A claimed that there were no
costs involved in arbitration by the District Officer or the District Commissioner.
Pursuit of a case to the Land Tribunal and Court or District Officer and District
Commissioner appears closed to a Kisii woman with a land dispute since she is likely to
have very limited resources. She would have difficulty paying the official fees as well as
lunch and transportation for the members of the Land Tribunal, nor would she be able to
pay 10,000 KSHs ($142) to start a lengthy court process. Finally, she is likely to
perceive the District Officer and District Commissioner as financially inaccessible to her.
As a result, her only option is to pursue dispute resolution through the elders and chiefs.
Dispute resolution by the elders and chiefs appears to be the least costly for a
woman with a land dispute, yet it is still too expensive for many of the most vulnerable
women. The women’s groups as well as the elders and chiefs were in agreement that
there is no cost at the initial family level. At the level of the elder however, a woman
bringing a land dispute must pay some money, though the amount varies. An elder from
Gucha explained that they don’t “have a fixed amount that you pay, but you pay what
you can afford” (AO 2006). This raises the possibility that if one party is able to pay
more money than the other, the elder may be compromised in his ability to adjudicate the
dispute. There is no accountability for this payment, as an elder from Kisii Central
admitted that “they usually ask for this informally. … But they are not supposed to ask
for anything” (ZN 2006). During the diagram exercise, the elders and chiefs estimated
that a woman would on average pay 140 KSHs ($2) to have the elders resolve a dispute.
The women’s groups on the other hand estimated that taking a dispute to the elder would
on average cost 980 KSHs ($14). It is perceived that even going to an elder is too costly
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for women, as the first step might require half her monthly income. The elders and chiefs
claimed that there were no costs at the chief’s level but the women’s groups estimated
that woman would on average pay 2500 KSHs ($35) to the assistant chief and then to the
chief. Again, this kind of cost is too high for an average woman in Kisii.
Figure 4
Cost Estimates for Adjudication in US Dollars

Elders
Chiefs
Land Tribunal
Courts

Women’s Estimates
$14
$35
$53
$142

Official’s Estimates
$2
$0
$14-$21
$142-$428

The existence of payments in the customary as well as the formal system was the
most consistent factor in the personal accounts of land disputes. It became apparent from
interview responses that in order to win a case, a complainant must be able to pay more
money than their opponent. For example, SM approached an elder concerning a dispute
in which her son had sold her land. She gave the chief 200 KSHs ($3) but the chief did
not rule in her favor “because the chief had been paid money by the buyer. … they paid
enough money” (SM 2006). In another case, a widow had been promised by the chief
that her land would be given back to her. However, when they met with the disputing
party to hand over the land, the chief asked her for 7000 KSHs ($100), knowing that she
would not be able to afford it. She suspected that her opponent had paid him more
money than she had. The chief then confirmed, through this request, that she could not
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pay him more than the other party, and thus passed his judgment that her land would not
be returned (MO 2006b).
The average estimated costs required to approach the elders and chiefs, although
lower than those required for the Land Tribunal and the Court, remain an obstacle for
women with severely limited resources, who are also the most vulnerable to land
insecurity and disputes.

Our findings mirror those of Chimhowu and Woodhouse who

find that increasing competition over land access belies the assumption that socially
embedded systems of landholding guarantee access (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2006).

Conclusion
In this study we have identified three findings that influence our understanding of
the difficulties and the effects of legal pluralism on the resolution of conflicts regarding
property. First, most women and many officials in the Provincial Administration did not
know the appropriate formal process for property dispute resolution. Second, despite
state law designed to undermine the role of elders and chiefs, their arbitration role in
property disputes remains and they are sought out by women with property disputes.
Lastly, we have identified the costs to using the informal system which, while less costly
than the formal system, is still prohibitively expensive for most women in Kisii.

The

same costs of accessing informal dispute resolution mechanisms are present for men in
the society as well, although they have greater access to family resources and their
vulnerability to property rights disputes is attenuated by the fact that they have control
over land (autonomous rights) rather than use rights. Peters observes that the ‘privileging
of contingency’ of customary land systems benefits some and harms others (Peters 2004).
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In this case we observe not only the benefits of particular groups under customary land
tenure systems, (men contrasted to women, married women to widows), but an analogous
difference in the accessibility of dispute resolution systems.
We note a ‘cross-contamination’ of legal systems (de Sousa Santos 2006).

The

customary legal system functions and feeds into the formal legal system which itself both
explicitly and implicitly adopts aspects of the traditional system creating a legal hybrid.
Moreover, it is clear that vestiges of the customary have become embedded in Kenyan
statute law, for example in the absence of legal guarantees of women’s co-ownership of
marital property.

Legal pluralism can be helpful in allowing people to negotiate

uncertainty through a variety of available channels of dispute resolution (Meinzen-Dick
and Pradhan 2002). However, in this case it appears to increase uncertainty for women
who are not aware of the formal legal processes available to them and who would have
difficulty accessing those formal processes due to cost.

Inaccessibility of dispute

resolution processes for women undermines the security of their property rights.
The literature regarding informal dispute resolution systems assumes they are
more accessible because of their reliance on local knowledge, their proximity and their
lower costs (Connolly 2005; Kane et al. 2005; Nyambu-Musembi 2003; Penal Reform
International 2000). Our study challenges that assumption. In Kenya we observe a
monetization of the traditional role of the elders with all of the attendant rent-seeking
possibilities that entails. Moreover, despite changes in law at the national level that are
designed to limit the role of chiefs and elders, people in rural areas far from the center of
power still seek their intervention in all property rights disputes, and the chiefs and elders
are still willing to fulfill that role.

In this particular case, women have difficulty
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defending their use rights to land (which are themselves inferior claims to land than title
or even autonomous possession) both through state channels and traditional mechanisms.
This is consistent with the work of Fitzpatrick who suggests that property rights failures
can be best described in terms of enforcement mechanisms (Fitzpatrick 2006).
Kenya is currently considering the adoption of a National Land Policy which
would replace the Land Disputes Tribunal Act of 1990 with district and community level
land tribunals. There will be an effort to “maximize the opportunity to apply Alternative
Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms such as negotiation, mediation and arbitration to
reduce the number of cases that end up in the court system” (Article 226 of the National
Land Policy).

If this does occur, the prospects for rural women receiving adequate

access to dispute resolution are likely to be quite limited. As things stand, ADR is the
only mechanism available to women, but it comes at too high a cost to be truly effective.
Without efforts to keep the cost of dispute resolution down or subsidize costs through the
state, women will face limited access to dispute resolution and continued insecurity of
property rights.
The results of this study are important to hold in context. We do not believe that
it is everywhere the case that traditional conflict resolution mechanisms have become
monetized to the extent that they are beyond the reach of those most in need of ADR
mechanisms.

We also make no claims regarding the equity of traditional dispute

resolution, particularly for women and strangers to communities. Indeed, we recognize
that the kinds of solutions that women are likely to get through traditional mechanisms
are likely to be inferior to those provided in formal law, in terms of the bundle of
property rights that can be defined and defended.
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We conclude here by returning to where we began. Property rights are extremely
important and their security is dependent upon the ability to defend what rights exist.
Women in Kisii do not have strong property rights as they only have secondary or use
rights to land; they do not have the ability to use their land as they wish or control
contracts relating to it. Moreover, they face challenges to their use rights to land when
their husbands die or they are divorced. Attempts to maintain use rights over their land
when widowed or divorced are not taken to the Land Tribunals because of the expense
involved. Pursuing the resolution of disputes through the customary system is also
prohibitively expensive. Thus, women in Kisii are in the unenviable position of having
weak property rights under customary law that are difficult to enforce under any available
legal system.
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